To Dwell for the Postcolonial by Farred, Grant
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XX, No 1 (2012)  |  www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2012.538 
 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No 
Derivative Works 3.0 United States License. 
 
This journal is operated by the University Library System of the University of Pittsburgh 
as part of its D-Scribe Digital Publishing Program, and is co-sponsored by the 
University of Pittsburgh Press 
To Dwell for the Postcolonial 
Grant Farred 
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy - Revue de la philosophie française et de 
langue française, Vol XX, No 1 (2012) pp 75-86.  
 
Vol XX, No 1 (2012) 
ISSN 1936-6280 (print) 
ISSN 2155-1162 (online) 
DOI 10.5195/jffp.2012.538 
www.jffp.org 
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XX, No 1 (2012)  |  www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2012.538 
To Dwell for the Postcolonial 
Grant Farred 
Cornell University 
Introduction 
Everyone can think what he likes, provided however that 
he thinks. 
– Jean-Paul Sartre, Preface, The Wretched of the Earth 
Perhaps everything needs to be started over again. 
– Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth 
 
It is doubtful that either Jean-Paul Sartre or Frantz Fanon would have 
understood himself as operating under the Heideggerian injunction, but that 
is precisely what they are doing. In Alain Badiou’s estimation, offered in The 
Clamor of Being, Martin Heidegger is the philosopher of the twentieth 
century. Heidegger holds this status for Badiou because of his attention to 
temporality and thinking. Sartre, it would seem, does not only understand 
the importance of thinking but it constitutes for him a prerequisite for 
participation in the political: “Everyone can think what he likes, provided 
however that he thinks.” For Heidegger, however, thinking, if it takes place, 
is almost indistinguishable from truth, so Sartre’s demand – “provided 
however that he thinks” – would strike Heidegger as a serious inability. For 
Heidegger to think is to grasp the truth, or, to come to truth through 
thinking, or, to know truth as thinking. In Heideggerian terms, Sartre’s 
tolerance, articulated as the conditional (the provisional), “provided,” 
reveals itself as a grievous mistake: the forming of an opinion is not 
thinking. 
According to Rüdiger Safranksi, one of Heidegger’s biographers, and to 
Heidegger himself, nothing matters quite as much as beginning, a truism if 
there ever was one, at the beginning. “‘Philosophizing,’” Heidegger was 
known to assert, “‘ultimately means nothing other than being a beginner’.”1  
Thinking from the beginning, is an invitation – the most direct form of 
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address, a challenge, a call to thinking – that Fanon issues to the postcolonial 
in The Wretched of the Earth. Fanon’s invitation, however, is seldom heard, 
and even less frequently taken up. But there can doubt about its clarity: 
“Perhaps everything needs to be started over again.” Not simply “started 
over again,” but “everything” – which means that nothing can be excluded, 
beginning with the postcolonial itself because that is the site of Fanon’s 
greatest resonance – must be made a matter for consideration. As Heidegger 
says about the “Old German words thing and dinc,” so the postcolonial must, 
now under the sign of the beginning, “become the name for an affair or a 
matter of pertinence”2 because the Fanonian articulation of the word 
“postcolonial” is now being returned to itself, remanded to a “first” thinking 
that is not a first thinking but a call for a thinking of how The Wretched of the 
Earth starts (a) thinking of the postcolonial.  
All that Fanon fought for The Wretched of the Earth, struggled for in Black 
Skins, White Masks, the radical political imagining that saturates his work, 
the philosophical imperative that shapes it insistently, those struggles for 
which he gave his life, “everything,” must be assigned a propositional 
“pertinence.” Not least of all, in this act of starting everything again, is the 
importance of recognizing the interrogative Frantz Fanon issues himself, 
and those who engage him: thinking Frantz Fanon must begin again, it is a 
project that must be started over. That is because of the all-inclusive 
“perhaps.” In the Fanonian articulation there is inscribed in “perhaps” a 
political charge that exceeds the propositional, an excess that returns, upon 
different terms, to the beginning. To the beginning, a beginning, that both is 
and is not overdetermined by the moment – either the historic significance 
of the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of The Wretched of the Earth or 
the condition of the extant postcolonial. Thinking, the postcolonial of 
(started, inaugurated by) The Wretched of the Earth in this instance, is only 
possible if it accepts as its primary condition, its proper first name, (the) 
“perhaps.”  
The “perhaps” requires the reluctant eschewing of the propositional, 
that which offers itself, however tentatively, as an answer, in favor of the 
suppositional, that which begins with only the proviso – the provisional. In 
the suppositional, it is possible that things might be so but, also, that they 
might not. It is in this way that the suppositional – “perhaps” – allows for 
the opening into thinking by assigning, to everyone, the designation 
beginner. If everyone is a beginner, then everyone might begin to think the 
postcolonial from the position of a shared suppositional; a suppositional, it 
should be added, that cannot ever be fully disarticulated from the 
propositional. Or, to invoke Sartre’s phrasing in philosophical terms 
recalibrated by Heidegger and Fanon’s work, “Everyone can think what he 
likes” as long as she or he begins with “perhaps.” The signal possibility that 
the “perhaps” of The Wretched of the Earth offers is, poorly phrased (in terms 
of how Heidegger thinks the concept in Being and Time), temporality. 
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However, reductive as such a gesture might be, the Fanonian “perhaps” 
makes possible a thinking of the postcolonial that begins not with its end (a 
discourse all too familiar to us), or, from its having ended (in abjection, in 
failure), but as The Wretched of the Earth’s thinking a “starting over again.”  
Fanon’s phrasing is succinct, but clear. This is not a new beginning, 
itself always only a putative possibility, but a starting over again. Starting 
over again demands a working with, a working over, if you will, extant 
conditions. Starting over attends to what is but refuses the very (necessary) 
delimitations of what is. It is a difficult project, to start over again, iterated 
already in the acknowledgement – starting over “again” – that such an 
imagining has a previous life (or, lives) but there is, as Fanon and Heidegger 
both remind us, no substitute for thinking again: making the “perhaps” of 
The Wretched of the Earth a supposition of pertinence. Heidegger, more than 
Fanon, is concerned with what is lost in the overuse of terms so that staring 
over again for him recognizes that “true meaning falls easily into oblivion in 
favor of foreground meanings.”3 However, Heidegger also understands both 
the retrievability – the recovery, the making audible again – of the “true 
meaning” and the kind of interrogation that is needed to achieve it: “its 
primal call does not thereby become incapable of speech; it merely falls 
silent.”4 In The Wretched of the Earth instance it is, of course, not the 
postcolonial that has “fallen silent;” it is, rather, that the “perhaps” was 
never (fully) heard. Its suppositionality (and its propositionality) was not 
only superseded by the romance of the postcolonial – the promise of 
“starting over” after colonialism, which is in truth a starting,  is the only 
“starting over” imaginable, despite Fanon’s warnings and cautions in The 
Wretched of the Earth. More pertinently, the “perhaps” was rendered 
inaudible, without any possibility of being heard, let alone taken up as a 
project for thought, a project already audible, ominously so, in The Wretched 
of the Earth. After all, Fanon warns, “We must not expect the nation to 
produce new men,”5 a declarative inaudible except as a command to 
thinking – at the very least, a call for the interrogative, an explication for 
why there will be no “new men.” If the “new nation” cannot be “expected” 
to “produce new men,” then this shortcoming constitutes a serious flaw in 
itself – considering Fanon’s attention to constructing a new political 
consciousness, a new thinking of the anti-colonial Self, in The Wretched of the 
Earth. At the very least, then, because of this, the “new nation” must 
“produce” a thinking about itself, a thinking about how it thinks; or, fails to 
think about what it is not thinking about. 
If the “nation” cannot produce “new men,” that is, a thinking disjoined 
from its colonial(ist) antecedent, then it is not, in Heidegger’s terms, a nation 
fit for dwelling. This is a project, dwelling, that girds The Wretched of the 
Earth. The postcolonial nation of The Wretched of the Earth is not, in 
Heideggerian terms, a building – broadly understood as the making, the 
constructing, the making possible of, that “space” – in which the 
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postcolonial can dwell; in which the postcolonial can be. As Heidegger 
understands, it is no small thing to dwell. For Heidegger to dwell means to 
be  
set at peace, means to remain at peace within the free, the preserve, 
the free sphere that  safeguards each thing in its nature. The 
fundamental character of dwelling is this sparing and preserving. It 
pervades dwelling in its whole range. That range soon reveals itself 
to us as soon as we reflect that human beings consist in dwelling 
and, indeed, dwelling in the sense of the stay of mortals on the 
earth.6 
In the most fundamental Heideggerian terms possible, dwelling is nothing 
less than Being. That is, dwelling is everything because “human being 
consist in dwelling.” These are the terms on which The Wretched of the Earth 
must be approached: as Fanon’s struggle to build the postcolonial as house 
for dwelling. That is the house that The Wretched of the Earth seeks to build, 
that is the house that thinking must now undertake, again (perhaps even 
over and over again), to build. Because building does not always, or 
necessarily, produce a dwelling – that in which the “fundamental character” 
of Being, Dasein, can be revealed, in which postcolonial Being can be 
“spared and preserved,” it is dwelling that must be the first order of 
postcolonial business. The call for a dwelling for postcolonialism is, in this 
Heideggerian way, the work that thinking must undertake; this is what the 
Fanonian “perhaps” makes audible; it is the making of a dwelling that must 
be sought for, built, in the act of “starting over again.” If the postcolonial 
dwelling is yet to be built, if the house in which postcoloniality can be has 
not yet been constructed, then it becomes imperative to understand that 
thinking postcolonialism as that which is yet to be thought is the task that 
The Wretched of the Earth sets. 
 
To Dwell for the Postcolonial 
Enough will have been gained if dwelling and building 
have become worthy of questioning and thus have remained 
worthy of thought. 
– Martin Heidegger, “Building Dwelling Thinking” 
The Third World must not be content to define itself in 
relation to values which preceded it. 
– Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth 
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The political imperative for Fanon, to make the nation after colonialism, 
translates as an address to the Heideggerian question: how to make a 
building in which the postcolonial can dwell? It is a question audible in so 
fundamental a biopolitical register as to be almost Agambenian: how to 
spare and preserve life? In Giorgio Agamben’s terms, of course, the terms 
would be read as “zoe” and “bios” – bare life and political life. These are, 
needless to say, critical issues, issues that have preoccupied postcolonial 
scholars for at least three generations now. 
From the very beginning, however, Fanon’s attention is both on the 
fundamental – which we might understand as the ongoing political struggle 
against, inter alia, inequity – and the inaugural. That is, with the beginning, 
that which understands its own precariousness, that which refuses the 
known – “The Third World must not be content to . . .” However, salient as 
his refusal of the dialectic is in this instance, much of Fanon’s thinking is 
prone to precisely this mode of thinking. Nowhere is Fanon’s dialectical 
materialism more evident than in “On Violence.” “The basic confrontation,” 
he writes, “which seemed to be colonialism versus anticolonialism, indeed 
capitalism versus socialism, is already losing its importance. What matters 
today, the issue which blocks the horizon, is the need for a redistribution of 
wealth.”7 Here Fanon’s thinking moves, rapidly, from the dialectic to what 
might seem like a synthetic call – for the “redistribution of wealth” – but it 
ends, in truth, with nothing but a declarative that spawns a further dialectic: 
“Humanity will have to address the question [of redistribution], no matter 
how devastating the consequences might be.”8   
It is because of Fanon’s proclivity for the dialectical and the declarative, 
however, that his brief turn from the former reveals the significance of the 
“perhaps.” In starting over, even if only for a moment, there can be no 
vitalization of the dialectic, itself issued, true to Fanonian form, as the 
declarative, albeit a far more tentative one than is at first apparent: “The 
Third World must not be content to define itself in relation to values which 
preceded it.” A double break is articulated here: (1) from the culture of the 
colonizer, itself, of course, an impossible sundering; and, (2) contra Fanon’s 
celebration of the colonized’s culture, the implicit recognition that there can 
be no (easy) hearkening to pre-coloniality. It is out of this aporia, the 
declarative that is grounded in nothing so much as uncertainty, that Fanon 
confronts at once the limits and the advantages of the dialectic. The dialectic 
derives its force from the oppositional, it provides something that can be 
argued against as well as struggled for. This, of course, is also its limit 
because every position must be measured, measure itself, against its 
antithesis. In its own way, the dialectic works, for all its gainsaying, 
primarily through the force of mediation. 
 If the dialectic is suspended, the question inherent in Fanon’s 
articulation persists: to which “values” will the postcolonial turn having 
recognized that it now operates under the terms of the double break? That 
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neither the immediate nor the distant past will suffice as models of thought? 
It is here that the “perhaps” comes into its own and it does so neither as the 
propositional nor the suppositional but as a sovereign “starting over.” The 
question that The Wretched of the Earth poses is one that Fanon cannot 
answer. He is vague, generic, unhelpfully categorical in addressing his own 
interrogative: “underdeveloped countries must endeavor to focus on their 
very own values as well as methods and style specific to them.”9 The only 
force that sustains Fanon’s critique of “values” is his repeated turn to 
thinking from the beginning; or, thinking as that act that marks the 
beginning of the postcolonial. Fanon’s skepticism about the “new,” his 
insistence on the insufficiency of the transition of political power from the 
colonizer to the colonized, persists: “The country finds itself under new 
management, but in actual fact everything has to be started over from 
scratch, everything has to be rethought.”10 The refrain of “starting over” is 
constant, buttressed in this instance by the determination that “everything 
has to be rethought.” 
 The Wretched of the Earth, for all Fanon’s commitment to the 
redistribution of wealth and resources, reveals itself as a work struggling, 
sometimes despite itself, even sometimes, it seems, unknown to itself, with 
the Manicheanism of the Cold War. That is, The Wretched of the Earth cannot, 
in its most philosophical moments (when thinking, not the political 
declarative, prevails), countenance either socialism or capitalism. Of course, 
Fanon has far greater regard for socialism, but The Wretched of the Earth is a 
struggle for what Heidegger names, elusively, the “unconcealedness of what 
is already there.”11 We might even name Fanon’s grasping for “values,” 
although it seems that it is something else that he is reaching for, a desire for 
a postcolonial élan vital – a more vital mode of postcolonial life, one in which 
a Heideggerian dwelling might be discerned. That is, where the “primal 
call” of the dwelling cannot only be heard, but where there is the intent to 
“remain at peace within the free, the preserve, the free sphere that 
safeguards each thing in its nature.” In this postcolonial dwelling, life is not 
only spared or preserved, it thrives; life knows no other mode except élan 
vital.  
 We do not think of Martin Heidegger as a radical environmentalist, 
and rightly so. There might, however, in “Building Dwelling Thinking” be 
reason to pause, albeit briefly, and consider him as such. In his poetic 
discussion of the “simple oneness of the four,” “earth and sky, divinities and 
mortals,” Heidegger argues: “Saving the earth does master the earth and 
does not subjugate it, which is merely one step from spoliation.”12 Much as it 
is incumbent, in Heidegger’s terms, upon “mortals” to desist from seeking to 
“master the earth” or “subjugating” it in order to avoid “spoliation,” so 
Fanon warns against another form of political “spoliation.” Heidegger’s 
injunction bears directly upon Fanon’s understanding of how the new 
nation will conduct its politics: “Achieving power in the name of a narrow-
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minded nationalism, in the name of race.” “Saving” (or, liberating; or, 
preserving life) the colonized from colonialism must not, as it were, mutate 
into subjugation through “narrow-minded nationalism;” “spoliation” is 
intolerable, under whatever guise it takes, “race” or any other. If Heidegger 
can be dubbed a momentary radical environmentalist, then Fanon stands as 
an environmentalist of the postcolonial variety: that figure of the political 
committed to, as Heidegger might have it, to “understanding the nature of the 
thing,”13 he who tends to the “thing,” he who cares for the earth, he who 
seeks to preserve the nation as indivisible from – because it is indivisible 
from – the sacrosanctness of the “four.” The “nature of the thing,” of 
anything, of all things, must be not only properly understood, but grasped 
in their relationship to other things; the radical environmentalist seeks to 
protect not only the earth, but humanity’s relationship to every other thing 
that surrounds it, that inhabits it.  
 Fanon, in the ideological grappling, the ideological commitments, the 
political struggle that animates The Wretched of the Earth, makes it a text of 
such philosophical pertinence that it is at one with Heidegger’s sensibility. 
Fanon’s “values” is nothing but a tentative naming for “something more.” 
Fanon rejects capitalism, is cautious about committing himself totally to the 
socialist project, because he senses – even if he cannot name it properly; he 
cannot name it properly because what he senses has, as yet, no name; 
because it has no name does not, however, undermine the sensory pull of 
“something more” – that the (re-)thinking will make something more 
available. What is is not enough. The new management, the new nation, is 
not enough; that is why there can be no “new man.” It is for this immediate 
reason that “everything needs to be started again.” For once there need be 
no hesitation in joining the Fanonian declarative: if what is is not enough, 
there is nothing to do but start again. In this instance we can dispense, if 
only here, dispense with the “perhaps.” 
Herein lies the Heideggerian challenge. How to “gather,” Heidegger’s 
term for the drawing together of things, for the drawing things into and out 
of themselves, drawing beyond the thing itself (gathering “expresses 
something that does not belong to it”)14, the “unconcealed” postcolonial into 
itself? How to, as Heidegger might insist, “presence” the “unconcealed?” 
How to reveal the postcolonial to itself? To “unconceal” is akin to how 
Heidegger explains what it takes to “save.” Both of these “really mean to set 
something free into its own presencing.”15 It is the possibility for 
“presencing” that converts the building into a dwelling. (It is this way that 
building is always subservient to, in the service of, dwelling. Building 
inclines toward that very “something that does not belong to it.” Dwelling, 
as form of withholding, must give itself to building in order for building to 
become dwelling: dwelling is the “expression” of what building is not.) For 
Heidegger, however, thinking the relationship of building to dwelling is a 
difficult process. While he insists that “not every building is a dwelling,” he 
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also has considerable regard for the act of building. So much so that he 
acknowledges that “all building is in itself a dwelling.”16 That is not to say, 
and if so only secondarily, that there is no undertaking of building that is 
not premised on the possibility of dwelling. Rather, it is to understand that it 
is the desire for dwelling that motivates “all building.” Dwelling comes 
before building. More poetically phrased, the “nature of building is letting 
dwell.”17 The intent of the building, that in which the building is conceived, 
to “let dwell.” Building is never, should never be, only to build; it must 
already be a dwelling before it is a building. Thinking the postcolonial as a 
dwelling precedes, for Fanon, the act of building the nation. At the core of 
dwelling is thinking; the act of building is not so much, though it is that too, 
instrumentalist – to make the nation – as it is the manifestation, the 
“presencing,” of the thinking of dwelling.  
Dwelling not only precedes building, but there can be building without 
the intent to dwell. Building cannot be undertaken without the 
Heideggerian imperative that is also, implicitly, a philosophical and political 
challenge: “Only if we are capable of dwelling, only then can we build.”18 Under 
these conditions, there must be no building that is not, before itself, thought 
as a dwelling. Is the nation where no new men are possible a building in 
which the postcolonial can dwell? Does it not, because it is only a building, 
already prohibit dwelling? If the building can no longer be dwelled in, if the 
thinking that made the building a dwelling has not been preserved, what is 
there to do but to start over and think again? What is there to do but start 
over and build a dwelling through thinking? If there is no presencing of 
dwelling, if there is no presencing in the dwelling, the building cannot 
stand. The “primal call” that is dwelling is only audible in, and because of, 
the thinking: “We are attempting to trace in thought the nature of 
dwelling.”19 There is no way to understand the relationship between 
building and dwelling, a relationship Heidegger traces with his customary 
divergences (we think building and dwelling with each other, as 
complementary, as one preceding the other, as mutually constitutive), 
except through thought. We can only come to know dwelling if we “trace” it 
through thought; if we understand that we must first commit ourselves to 
think before it will even be possible to approach dwelling.  
And we must think dwelling, we must follow the trace, wherever it may 
lead us, because dwelling is Being. It is for this reason that it Heidegger 
finds it so inexplicable that, for others, “dwelling is not experienced as man’s 
being; dwelling is never thought of as the basic character of human being.”20 
If there is no dwelling in which the postcolonial is “experienced as man’s 
being,” in which dwelling is thought of as the “basic character” of the 
postcolonial, can the postcolonial be said to have started already? Where is 
the trace of thought in the postcolonial? How can the postcolonial be if not 
in the thinking, a thinking that accepts – as the necessary beginning – 
dwelling as “man’s being?” We must “think for the sake of dwelling.”21 In 
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order to dwell we must think. If this the condition of thought, then the 
question provoked – we might even say directly posed – by this Heidegger 
essay is one capable of rearticulating the principle that girds “Building 
Dwelling Thinking,” a naming that is already an ascension, a hierarchy that 
moves from “building” to “thinking,” is a pertinent one: if we dwell because 
we think, can we think without dwelling? Is the trace of dwelling inscribed 
in (all) thinking? Is all thinking directed toward dwelling? So that we might 
dwell in thought, dwell because of thought? 
 
Perhaps 
O, call back yesterday, bid time return!  
– King Richard II. Act iii. Sc. 2 
 
Where is the “presencing” of the postcolonial to be glimpsed if not in the 
Fanonian “perhaps?” It is the possibility for postcolonial “presencing” that 
Fanon, in these speculative, almost disjunctive moments, senses in The 
Wretched of the Earth. It is being, Fanon senses, that might be found – might 
be dwelling – in the “perhaps;” it is something of this magnitude that Fanon 
senses lies before him. “Presencing” makes of the postcolonial a dwelling, it 
makes the building of the nation into a dwelling; “presencing” is 
“unconcealed” in the act of “starting over.” The postcolonial dwelling lies 
before Fanon, waiting – demanding – only to be thought, requiring only a 
thinking against the building, a thinking against the building that is not 
enough. Neither “presencing” nor “man’s being” is easily accessible for 
Heidegger. The word he uses, as we know by now, is “unconcealed:” it 
requires that “presencing” or “man’s being” be taken out of concealment. It 
is only possible to dwell if the building is built with dwelling in mind; if the 
building is built as a dwelling, not as a building.  
The (postcolonial) nation against which The Wretched of the Earth 
struggles was constructed as a building. It is a nation that did not think of 
how to think a dwelling. Or, more laboriously phrased, the new nation did 
not think of how to build itself as a dwelling. (Fanon’s distinction between 
the two modes of thinking – the nation – is critical here: “National 
consciousness, which is not nationalism, is alone capable of giving us an 
international dimension.”)22 “Nationalism” did not seek to understand the 
kind of unconcealment that makes “national consciousness” possible 
because it is itself nothing less than an obdurate form of concealment; or, in 
Heidegger’s terms, it would be very difficult to find a “trace of thought” in 
nationalism. Because it tends so obstinately toward itself, because it has no 
conception of how to think – how to approach – unconcealment, it cannot 
not see, it cannot know, in both the colloquial and the Heideggerian sense, 
what lies before it.  
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If it seems at times, entirely plausibly, that Fanon’s distinction between 
“nationalism” and “national consciousness” is a precarious, less than 
rigorously thought attempt to enforce difference, then it is philosophically 
spared because of what he senses. That is, it is unconcealment toward which 
he reaches in The Wretched of the Earth. Whatever the conceptual limitations 
that mark Fanon’s delineation of “national consciousness,” however closely 
it veers toward “nationalism,” whatever the amount of clarification required 
in order that the terms might be more easily disarticulated, there can be no 
doubt that Fanon understands the following: “national consciousness” is 
that mode of being that “expresses something that does not belong to it.” Or, 
more importantly for our purposes, it “expresses” – it gathers us away from 
nationalism, so to speak – “something that does not yet belong to it.” That is 
to say, there is “something” in Fanon’s insistence upon the distinction that 
gathers us away from “narrow-minded nationalism,” it alerts us to those 
who invoke “race” expediently. We must ask, and remember, with 
Heidegger: “What is that name which names what is called for? Surely the 
word ‘thinking.’”23 It is always necessary to “think” the “name” in whose 
name we are called to mobilize, to act; it is always necessary to “think” 
about what the “name calls for.” There can be no way to take up the “name” 
“nationalism” except through thought. Fanon’s thought as regards the 
distinction might lack in assiduousness, but in its rudimentary caution it 
understands that “nationalism” does not belong in the postcolonial. 
Nationalism is the name which must be resisted, however it dissembles, 
whatever name it assumes for the purpose of conducting its politics. It is in 
the name of this resistance that, contra Heidegger, it might be possible to 
bring together – to gather into our thinking – “historical and philosophical 
knowledge.”24 They might be, “by an ancient doctrine . . . radically different 
from each other,”25 but their occasional gathering together enables them to 
think efficaciously against “nationalism.” “Historical and philosophical 
knowledge” might be made to dwell together against the building that is 
nationalism.  
It is because Fanon knows the value, if you will, of “what is already 
there” that The Wretched of the Earth stands as a thinking about how make the 
postcolonial presence itself. The presencing of the postcolonial is audible in 
the iteration “everything must be started over again.” The Wretched of the 
Earth is the struggle to make manifest, or reveal, like the Dasein (or Ereignis) 
of Heidegger’s Being and Time, “what is already there.” It is for this reason 
that the structure of Fanon’s argument in The Wretched of the Earth is salient. 
Fanon’s work builds, as it were, from the question about values through his 
critique of technocracy (the inadequacy of “new management”) where the 
refrain of “starting over” first manifests itself to the constative recognition – 
“Perhaps everything needs to be started over again.”  
“Perhaps” the postcolonial must be thought not in Shakespearean 
formulation, so redolent with nostalgia and loss, “bid time return.” 
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“Perhaps” the unconcealedness of the postcolonial is the thinking of 
temporality that will not permit of the chronological – that which would ask 
for the “return” of the moment. Rather, the postcolonial must be thought as 
a Fanonian project: the “Third World’s” refusal to follow relationally after; 
that is, the eidos that insists that the postcolonial can only come after the 
colonial. If Heidegger and Fanon’s arguments are in any way instructive 
(and theirs are, in this regard, lofty sensibilities), then it is in their ability to 
explicate that the postcolonial has not yet passed. The postcolonial is what 
lies ahead, unconcealed, it is still to come, unconcealed, because it has not 
been thought. That is the project: to make a dwelling (fit) for the 
postcolonial, that dwelling in which it would be possible to be postcolonial.  
Because there is as yet no dwelling for the postcolonial, it becomes 
possible to say that the postcolonial has not yet begun – “Perhaps everything 
needs to be started again.” That is, following Fanon, we were never 
postcolonial. There is, then, no better time to press the “perhaps” into both 
historical and philosophical duty because, fifty years after Fanon named the 
difficulties, we must ask, in his name: is there any better occasion to start 
again, to think on how we might be postcolonial? “What is that name which 
names what is called for?” Heidegger’s is a contorted phrasing, but it 
demands, at the very least, an account of the name – the “postcolonial” – 
and he asks what is it in Fanon’s work that calls us? What does The Wretched 
of the Earth call for? In the name of what does it call us? 
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